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O n July 9 2004, the International Court of Justice rendered probably one 
of its mos t important advisory opinions which will presumably be also among 
the mos t controversial o n e s 1 . 
T h e facts are wel l -known: two years ago, Israel took the decision to 
build an enormous wall surrounding the Palestinian territories in order to 
prevent the arrival of terrorists. The construction was conceived as a 
unilaterally decided e lement of the "peace p rocess" the ul t imate a im of which 
is the es tabl ishment of a Palestinian state. Sha ron ' s government had to give 
not only a concession for "hardl iners" in the Israeli Par l iament to secure their 
approval of the continuation of internationally media ted talks (the so-called 
"Roadmap" process) but it was also chal lenged by the ongoing terrorist acts 
perpetrated into the intifada. Accord ing to p o o l s 2 , the construction of the wall 
* Péter Kovács is professor of international law of the Miskolc University and 
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1. For a very good interpretation issued just after the delivery of the opinion, cf. 
the commentary written by P.H.F Bekker, former staff-member of the ICJ: BEKKER, 
P.H.F.: The World Court Rules that Israel's West Bank Barrier Violates International 
Law, ASIL Insights, July 2004. See also: Princeton prof, emeritus FALK, R.: Support 
for Wall Mocks International Law (Miami Herald 7/20/04), reprinted in The Middle 
East Research and Information Project (http://www.merip.org/newspaper_org/ 
newspaper_opeds/oped072004.html) 
2. 90 %, according to a radioprogram of the National Public Radio (Written 
version of the program of September 2, 2003: Analysis: How New Israeli Security 
Wall is Seen by Israelis?) (http:www.npr.org/programs/atc/transcripts/2003/sep/ 
030902.kenyon.html). 
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is backed by the immense majority of Israelis, they consider it as an important 
e lement of their legit imate self-defense based on the wish to live in peace and 
security .The results and methods of retaliatory actions of the Israeli a rmy as 
well as the measures of self-defence have been criticized in international 
o rgan iza t ions 3 and mass media because of loss in civilian life and property. In 
the meant ime , Arafa t ' s Palestinian Authori ty seems to be unable and maybe 
unwil l ing to control the situation on Palest inian side and the quasi head of 
state of the Palestinian Terri tory lost his credit as well in Israel as in the 
United States. The photos of Clinton, Rabin and Arafat shaking hands have 
faded: only Arafat is still in office, but he is under a de facto in ternment by 
the Israeli a rmy into the res idence of Ramal lah , somet imes very similar to a 
military siege. (Arafat could leave however his headquar ter at the end of 
October 2004 in order to be hospital ized in Paris beacuse of serious health 
problems.) The Security Counci l , as usual , has been unable to act with 
efficacy in the matter but it has adopted a good number of resolutions in 
secondary quest ions of the peace p r o c e s s 4 and the fight against terrorism. 
This is the context in which the mot ion submit ted by Arab states was backed 
by the General Assembly which asked the International Court of Just ice to 
answer the question in the form of an advisory opinion: "What are the legal 
consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by Israel, 
the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and 
around East Jerusalem, as described in the report of the Secretary-General, 
considering the rules and principles of international law, including the Fourth 
Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant Security Council and General 
Assembly resolutions!" 
W h e n the International Court of Just ice was seized of the matter , it 
decided to use the new communica t ion facilities thus giving public access not 
3. See e.g. Resolution 1544(2004): "The Security Council (...) Reiterating the 
obligation of Israel, the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously by its legal 
obligations and responsibilities under the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of war of 12 August 1949, Calling on Israel to 
address its security needs within the boundaries of international law (...) Calls on 
Israel to respect its obligations under international humanitarian law and insists, in 
particular, on its obligation not to undertake demolition of homes contrary to that law 
(...)". 
4. Supported inter alia by the resolutions 1544(2004), 1515(2003), etc. of the 
Security Council. According to resolution 1515(2003) "The Security Council (...) 1. 
Endorses the Quartet Performance-based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State 
Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (S/2003/529); 2. Calls on the parties to 
fulfil their obligations under the Roadmap in cooperation with the Quartet and to 
achieve the vision of two States living side by side in peace and security; 3. Decides to 
remain seized of the matter". 
448 
RATHER JUDGEMENT THAN OPINION? 
only to memoranda and other written documents of cca. fourty states and 
international organizat ions but, for the first t ime, to auditions and the delivery 
of the opinion, which were t ransmit ted " l ive" and with replay-possibil i t ies 
from the Wor ld Cour t ' s h o m e page. 
In the following pages, we try to highlight the most important dicta of 
the ICJ with references to the corresponding paragraphs of the advisory 
opinion. Our commenta ry does not want to be exhaust ive: on the one hand w e 
would like to put emphasis on top legal a rguments related to the case and on 
general problems of international law as reflected in the opinion, on the other. 
1. DOES THE COURT HAVE COMPETENCE TO DELIVER THE OPINION? 
Participating in the written phase of the procedure , but abstaining from 
audit ions, Israel chal lenged the legality of the resolution of the General 
Assembly , considering it as an ultra vires action. (§ 24). She also referred to 
the " Eastern-Carelia rule" when pledging the Court not to reply. (§ 46) Israel 
emphas ized the complexi ty of the highly poli t icized Near-Eas t issue where 
law is only one of the e lements of a puzzle . (§ 46) . 
W h e n deciding upon the first objection, the Court examined the 
regularity of the antecedents and the events of the Tenth Emergency Session 
of the G.A. and it referred to several aspects of the famous 377(V) resolution, 
known as "Uniting for Peace". It is worth noting that the wording of the 
Court apparently does not reveal any doubt on the legality of the resolution so 
much quest ioned in the past. (§ 30). 
In the traditional duel of the opinion on the Status of Eastern-Carelia5 
versus the opinion on the interpretation of the peace treaties with Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Romanian, the Court points out (§ 44) that " the very particular 
c i rcumstances of the case" explained the P C I J ' s refusal, thus repeating the 
words of the advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons''. Even if, in the given case, it is evident that the advisory opinion 
would have a considerable impact on the for thcoming phases of dispute 
sett lement, nevertheless the Court repeats verbatim from the Peace treaties 
5. July 23 1923, PCIJ, Series B, No. 5 p. 29 "Answering the question would be 
substantially equivalent to deciding the dispute between the parties". 
6. March 30 1950, ICJ Reports 1950 p. 71 and ss. 
7. July 8 1996, ICJ Reports 1996 pp. 235-236, para. 14. 
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advisory opinion that consent of States, part ies to a dispute have a different 
vocation in a content ious case than in the procedure of an advisory opinion. (§ 
47) . The Court emphas izes its discret ionary power and refers to the lack of 
compel l ing reasons which could oblige her to refuse the delivery of the 
opinion. (§§ 45 , 47) . For the Court , the main reason is however that the issue 
is not (only) a bilateral dispute but a genuine matter of international concern: 
it does not share the view that " the subject-matter of the General A s s e m b l y ' s 
request can be regarded as only a bilateral mat ter be tween Israel and 
Palest ine. Given the powers and responsibili t ies of the United Nat ions in 
quest ions relating to international peace and security, it is the Cour t ' s v iew 
that the construct ion of the wall must be deemed to be directly of concern to 
the United Nat ions" . (§ 49) . The history of the mandate over Palestine and the 
partition of the territory by the United Nat ions are also evoked as reasons why 
the Uni ted Nat ions and especial ly the General Assembly are enti t led to deal 
with the quest ion of the wall . (§ 49) . 
Concerning the third objection, it is not surprising that the Court , in 
conformity with its long-standing jur isprudence, does not accept the a rgument 
based on the al leged lack of justiciabil i ty: it confirms the well established 
thesis that legal points can be adjudged in themselves without entering into 
the realm of polit ics. (§§ 36-41) . There is an interesting aspect of this 
argument which is also referred to as an illustration of the the finality of the 
advisory opinion in abstracto but also in concreto, as far as it is evident 
— and Israel also ment ioned this fact in her m e m o r a n d u m — that the General 
Assembly has qualified the wall illegal long before the advisory opinion. (§§ 
60-61) . Accord ing to the Court , as not all the possible consequences have 
been de termined by the General Assembly , the opinion would have a real 
contribution in seeing properly the legal issues. (§ 62) . 
2. NATURE AND DETAILS OF APPLICABLE LAW 
After the lengthy presentat ion of the history of the different relevant 
resolutions of the General Assemby and the Security Counci l concerning the 
occupied territories (§§ 68-78) , the Court proves that the Uni ted Nat ions 
consequently appealed for the respect of international humani tar ian law (in its 
cus tomary and writ ten forms as well) and for non recognit ion of territories 
acquired by force. The geographical and technical details and the history of 
the construction of the wall are presented most ly on the basis of the Secretary 
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Genera l ' s report (§§ 79-85) and the Court points out that there is somet imes a 
considerable difference be tween the Green line, I s rae l ' s internationally 
recognized demarcat ion line — in lack of a recognized boundary — and the 
location of the wall . (§ 83). The difference means 975 k m 2 and for the t ime 
being it is embrac ing 237000 Palest inians, but after the complet ion of the 
Wal l , another 160000 will be added to them. Moreover , these people are 
somet imes quasi c losed in enclaves. 
Concerning the applicable law for the status of these territories, the 
Cour t refers first to article 2(4) of the Uni ted Nat ions Charter , resolution 
2625(XXV) , the c o m m o n article 1 of the 1966 Covenants and the different 
dicta of the judicial interpretation of the self-determination principle. (§§ 87-
88). Even if Israel is not a contract ing party to the Fourth Hague Convent ion 
of 1907, the Court does not see any obstacle to the postulat ion of I s rae l ' s 
obligations on the basis of cus tomary law. (§ 89). 
Israel is bound by the Fourth Geneva Convent ion of 1949 but before the 
Court , she did not admit its applicability to the occupied territories because of 
" the lack of recognit ion of the territory as sovereign prior to its annexat ion by 
Jordan and Egyp t" and inferring that it is "not a territory of a High 
Contract ing Party as required by the Convent ion" . (§ 90) . It is worth not ing 
that in 1982, the P L O acting as Palest ine m a d e a unilateral undertaking for the 
respect of this Convent ion even if Switzerland, the depositary did not pass a 
decision upon its formal request of accession submitted in 1989. Examin ing 
the finality of the Convent ion, as well as its travaux préparatoires and also 
the subsequent posit ions of the I C R C , the Genera l Assembly and the Security 
Counci l , the Court gave a different interpretation to the allusion of article 2 to 
"contract ing part ies" . Contrary to its literal meaning "contract ing par t ies" 
should simply be unders tood as "part ies to the conflict" for the purpose of the 
applicability of the Convent ion. (§§ 95-99) . T h e Court also notes however 
that a military order issued in the "Six-Day W a r " a s well as a j udgmen t of 
Is rae l ' s Supreme Court recognized expressis verbis the applicability of the 
Fourth Geneva Convent ion to the Wes t Bank. (§§ 9 3 , 100). Consequent ly , the 
Court comes to the conclusion that the Fourth Geneva Convent ion is pert inent 
in the assessment of the current situation. 
T h e applicability of the two U N human rights covenants of 1966 was 
similarly refused by Israel. (§ 102). The Cour t recalls "that the protection 
offered by human rights convent ions does not cease in case of a rmed conflict, 
save through the effect of provisions for derogat ion of the kind to be found in 
Art icle 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" . In 
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armed conflicts, the covenants (with the restriction above) and also the 
Convent ion on the Rights of the Child can and should be implemented 
paralelly to humanitar ian law instruments . (§106). A country must not limit 
the applicability of these Covenants solely to her own territory when she is 
exercising a de facto power e lsewhere on a territory under jurisdict ion namely 
by military occupat ion. (§§ 107-113). Here , the Court can also rely on the 
posit ion of the U N H u m a n Rights Commit tee . 
The Court puts that "that the existence of a «Palestinian people» is no 
longer in i ssue" and the true existence of this people and their " legi t imate 
r ights" under which the right to self-determination is to be unders tood were 
recognized not only by the United Nat ions but also by Israel in different 
phases of the peace-negotiat ions. (§ 118). The Court warns that there is "a 
risk of further alterations to the demographic composi t ion of the Occupied 
Palestinian Terri tory result ing from the construction of the wall inasmuch as 
it is contributing (...) to the departure of Palestinian populat ions from certain 
areas. That construction, a long with measures taken previously, thus severely 
impedes the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-
determinat ion, and is therefore a breach of Is rae l ' s obligation to respect that 
r ight". (§122). 
The Court also gives interpretation of Article 49 , paragraph 6 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convent ion: "The Occupying Power shall not deport or 
transfer parts of its own civilian populat ion into the territory it occupies" . 
According to the Court "That provision prohibits not only deportat ions or 
forced transfers of populat ion such as those carr ied out during the Second 
Wor ld War, but also any measures taken by an occupying Power in order to 
organize or encourage transfers of parts of its own populat ion into the 
occupied terri tory". Recal l ing the relevant Security Counci l documents , the 
Court concludes "that the Israeli set t lements in the Occupied Palest inian 
Terri tory (including East Jerusalem) have been established in breach of 
international law". (§ 120). Al though Israel gave "assurance (...) that the 
construction of the wall does not amount to annexat ion and that the wall is of 
a temporary na ture" the Court considers that "the construct ion of the wall and 
its associated regime create a "fait accompli' on the ground that could well 
become permanent , in which case, and notwithstanding the formal 
characterization of the wall by Israel, it would be tantamount to de facto 
annexat ion". (§ 121). 
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As far as the Hague and Geneva Convent ions are concerned, the Court 
cites most ly the rules concerning the respect of civilian property, the 
min imum intervention into day-to-day life and work of civil ians. (§ 126). 
F rom the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights , the Court 
refers to Article 12 (1) ("Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State 
shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movemen t and freedom 
to choose his res idence") and Article 17(1) ("No one shall b e subjected to 
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputat ion") . The 
Court notes that Israel made use of the possibility of derogation under article 
4 but only vis-á-vis article 9 of the I C C P R i.e. the habeas corpus rule.(§ 126). 
The Cour t combines the interpretation of these rules with obligations to grant 
free access to the Holy Places, as guaranteed in different documents in 
particular the 1878 Berlin Treaty, the 1922 British Manda te and 1949 General 
Armist ice , stipulating the so called Green line as demarcat ion l ine be tween 
Israel and Jordan. (§ 129). As far as the International Covenant on Economic , 
Social and Cultural Rights and the Convent ion on the Rights of the Child are 
concerned, the Court refers mainly to the right to education, to an adequate 
standard of living, right to work, etc. (§§ 130-131). 
The Court seems to be shocked that "Qalqil iya, a city with a populat ion 
of 40,000, is complete ly surrounded by the wall and residents can only enter 
and leave through a single military checkpoint open from 7 a.m. to 7 p .m." (§ 
133) and it considers that the construction of the wall has "serious 
repercussions for agricultural product ion". (§ 133). The Court builds its 
argumentat ion on the lengthily cited assessment of facts by different special 
rapporteurs appointed by the Secretary General . 
The Court comes to the conclusion that "the construction of the wall and 
its associated reg ime impede the liberty of movemen t of the inhabitants of the 
Occupied Palestinian Terri tory (with the except ion of Israeli citizens and 
those assimilated thereto) as guaranteed under Article 12, paragraph 1, of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights . They also impede the 
exercise by the persons concerned of the right to work, to health, to education 
and to an adequate standard of living as procla imed in the International 
Covenant on Economic , Social and Cultural Rights and in the United Nat ions 
Convent ion on the Rights of the Child. Last, the construction of the wall and 
its associated regime, by contributing to the demographic changes referred to 
in paragraphs 122 and 133 above, contravene Art icle 49 , paragraph 6, of the 
Fourth Geneva Convent ion and the Security Counci l resolut ions". (§ 134). 
453 
PÉTER KOVÁCS 
It is certainly true that military necessit ies can be invoked by States to 
avoid abiding to some rules of humani tar ian law but the Court emphas izes 
that according to the text of the Geneva Convent ion e.g. the prohibit ion of the 
transfer of populat ion cannot be suspended on this basis . This exception can 
theoretically live together with the rule of the respect of property and 
interdiction of destruction, but the Court is not convinced about the existence 
of such an absolute necessity as required by the Convent ion. (§ 135). In the 
interpretation of the so called limitation rules of the Covenants , the Court puts 
emphasis on the finality and proportionali ty of the intervention of a State (for 
public order or national security) in the enjoyment of these rights, condit ions 
which are not met in the present issue, as the ICJ underl ined. (§§ 136-137). 
Israel also invoked the legit imacy of self-defence in order to justify the 
construction of the wall . (§ 138). The Court recognizes the applicability of 
self-defence in international law only in a state-to-state a rmed attack: in a 
very elegant (but slightly contradictory) way , it refuses the transposit ion of 
the "9/11 self-defence" concept al though it recognizes retroactively the 
correctness of the relevant Security Counci l resolutions adopted in the 
aftermath of the WTC- t ragedy . "The Cour t also notes that Israel exercises 
control in the Occupied Palestinian Terri tory and that, as Israel itself states, 
the threat which it regards as justifying the construction of the wall originates 
within, and not outside, that territory. The situation is thus different from that 
contemplated by Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) , 
and therefore Israel could not in any event invoke those resolutions in support 
of its c la im to be exercising a right of self-defence". (§ 139). 
The Cour t asks whether the state of necessity can be evoked in this case 
as an eventual exculpation of wrongfulness. The International Law C o m m i s -
s ion ' s Articles on Responsibil i ty of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
is used for this purpose and especially the reference to "grave and imminent 
peri l" . The answer is however negative: "In the light of the material before it, 
the Court is not convinced that the construction of the wall along the route 
chosen was the only means to safeguard the interests of Israel against the peril 
which it has invoked as justification for that construct ion". (§ 140). Al though 
recognizing that Israel has " the right, and indeed the duty, to respond in order 
to protect the life of its c i t izens" (§ 141), the Court warns that "the measures 
taken are bound nonetheless to remain in conformity with applicable 
international law". (§ 141). Accordingly, the Cour t comes to the conclusion 
"that the construct ion of the wall , and its associated regime, are contrary to 
international law". (§ 142). 
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3. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE JUDICIAL APPRECIATION OF THE 
SITUATION 
The Court considers that the consequences of this statement concern 
essentially Israel, but also other countr ies and "where appropr ia te" the Uni ted 
Nat ions as well . (§ 148). 
First, "Israel is bound to comply with its obligation to respect the right 
of the Palestinian people to self-determination and its obligations under 
international humanitar ian law and international human rights law. Further-
more , it must ensure freedom of access to the Holy Places that c ame under its 
control following the 1967 War" . (§ 149). Secondly, "Israel also has an obli-
gation to put an end to the violation of its international obligations flowing 
from the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palest inian Terr i tory". (§ 
150). This means not only that Israel should put an end to the construction but 
she should repeal all legislative and administrat ive acts related thereto. 
(§151). Israel has the obligation to m a k e reparation for the damage caused to 
all the natural or legal persons concerned (§ 152) and in case of immobi le 
propert ies (where possible) to apply the principle of the in integrum restitutio, 
and where this is impossible , to compensa te damages and losses. (§ 153). 
The Court adds that "both Israel and Palestine are under an obligation 
scrupulously to observe the rules of international humani tar ian law, one of the 
paramount purposes of which is to protect civilian life. Illegal actions and 
unilateral decisions have been taken on all sides, whereas , in the Cour t ' s 
view, this tragic situation can be brought to an end only through implemen-
tation in good faith of all relevant Securi ty Counci l resolut ions". (§ 162). 
Laying stress on the erga omnes character of some violated norms (i.e. 
self-determination (§§ 155-156) and humanitar ian law (§§ 157-158), the 
Court procla ims the obligation of all the States i.e. "not to recognize the 
illegal situation result ing from the construction of the wall in the Occupied 
Palest inian Terri tory, including in and around East Jerusalem. They are also 
under an obligation not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation 
created by such construction. It is also for all States, whi le respect ing the 
United Nat ions Char ter and international law, to see to it that any 
impediment , result ing from the construction of the wall , to the exercise by the 
Palestinian people of its right to self-determination is brought to an end". (§ 
159). Moreover — even if it is not really clear how States can do so — the 
Court calls them " to ensure compl iance by Israel with international 
humani tar ian law (...)". (§ 159). 
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What are the duties of the Uni ted Nat ions and in particular those of the 
General Assembly and the Security Counci l? 
The Court hereby emphas izes "the urgent necessity for the United 
Nat ions as a whole to redouble its efforts to br ing the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, which continues to pose a threat to international peace and security, 
to a speedy conclusion, thereby establishing a jus t and lasting peace in the 
region". (§ 161). The Court is going further when referring to " the need for 
these efforts to be encouraged with a view to achieving as soon as possible, 
on the basis of international law, a negotiated solution to the outstanding 
problems and the establ ishment of a Palestinian State, existing side by side 
with Israel and its other neighbours, with peace and security for all in the 
region". (§ 162). 
Here — with all the respect due to the judges — we are far from the 
wording of the original demand for an advisory opinion. These wishes — let 
us hope that not merely wishful thoughts — draw the great lines of a 
comprehens ive solution. Certainly, there is nothing here which could not be 
backed by series of resolutions adopted by the Security Council or the 
General Assembly , nevertheless this obiter dictum is very close to what one 
could qualify as judicial activism. 
4. EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE PEACE PROCESS? 
It is of paramount impor tance that the decision about the jurisdict ional 
competence of the Court to give the advisory opinion was adopted with total 
unanimity and the decision about complying with the request was adopted 
in quasi unanimity with only one vote against, namely Buergentha l ' s , the 
Amer ican j u d g e ' s . The same 14:1 score can be seen in the different subpoints, 
with the except ion of the reference to obligations binding in this mat ter all the 
states when judge Buergenthal was backed by judge Koi jmans . 
Judges Koroma, Higgins , Koi jmans , Al -Khasawneh , Elaraby and O w a d a 
appended separate opinions to the advisory opinion, and judge Buergenthal 
appended a declaration thereto. 
It is not easy to foresee the real impact of the advisory opinion on the 
issue itself. The first official reactions in Israel were very negat ive and 
reflected a comple te refusal. (It is known however that the already ment ioned 
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decision of the Supreme C o u r t 8 legally obl iged the Israeli government to 
change slightly the exact line of the wall and the government promised to 
e x e c u t e 9 this ruling). Even if there are considerable differences be tween the 
two documents , starting with the actual case under e x a m i n a t i o n 1 0 but espe-
cially the fact that the Supreme Court is accepting security as basic 
motivat ion of the construction p o l i c y 1 1 , it is very important however to see 
how close the logic of the Israeli Supreme Court and the International Court 
of Just ice are to each other in the assessment of the per t inence of re levant 
international humanitar ian law treaties and the ensuing c o n s e q u e n c e s 1 2 . "The 
route disrupts the delicate balance be tween the obligation of the military 
8. See Sliman's commentary on the decision in ASIL Insights July 2004. 
S U M A N , N.: Israeli High Court Decision on Location of West Bank Barrier. See also 
MOORE, M.: Israeli Court Orders Changes in Barrier (Route Through West Bank 
Found to Violate Palestinians' Right (Washington Post Foreign Service July 1, 2004) 
ht tp : / /www.washingtonpost .com/wp-dyn/ar t ic les /A16630-2004Jun30.html and 
URQUHART, C : Israel wall must be re-routed says court (The Gurdian July 1, 2004) 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/international(story/0,3604,1251137,00.html and Court 
orders changes to West Bank wall (The Guardian, June 30, 2004) http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/o,2763,1250608,00.html. 
9. "Israeli Deputy Defense Minister, Zeev Boim, said «we are going to 
implement the Supreme Court's decision, but we hope that in the future things will not 
drag on too long and will allow us to get on with building this project, which is a 
necessity for security»". Israeli Court Freezes Work on Part of West Bank Barrier in: 
U.N.Wire Friday, July 2, 2004, http://www.unwire.org/UNWIRE/20040702/449_ 
25509.asp "In a statement issued after the ruling was announced, the Defense Ministry 
said: «The defence establishment respects the judgment of the Supreme Court 
concerning those sections of the security fence that require replanning. The replanning 
of these sections will be based on...the proper balance between security and 
humanitarian considerations". MOORE, M.: loc.cit. 
10. The case submitted before the Supreme Court concerned only a 40 km 
section of the Wall. 
11. "The High Court accepted the State's argument that the wall is constructed 
for security purposes and rejected the petitioner's contention that the construction is 
motivated by political considerations", Sliman, op. cit. 
12. "Using as a point of departure that Israel holds the Occupied West Bank in 
belligerent occupation, the High Court said that the authority of the military 
commander in that area flows from the provisions of public international law 
established principally in the 1907 Hague Regulations, which reflect customary 
international law, and the humanitarian provisions of the 1949 Fourth Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. The High 
Court cited Articles 23(g) and 52 of The Hague Regulations and Article 53 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention as authorizing the Occupant to confiscate private property 
if it is necessary for military purposes, provided that compensation is paid. In addition, 
it recalled its previous decisions justifying the taking of private property to build 
military compounds, fencing outposts, providing temporary housing for soldiers, 
securing transportation, building civil administration facilities, and stationing soldiers 
on private property. However, the military commander must take the needs of the 
local community into consideration, but this question pertains to the route of the wall, 
not to the authority to build it". SLIMAN, op. cit. 
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c o m m a n d e r to preserve security and his obligation to provide for the needs of 
the local inhabitants. ( . . . ) The route that the military commande r established 
for the security fence . . . injures the local inhabitants in a severe and acute 
way while violating their rights under humani tar ian and international l a w " 1 3 . 
Related to the specificities of the war against terrorism, one of the basic 
thoughts of the Supreme Court could also have been pronounced by the ICJ 
"at the end of the day, a struggle according to the law will s trengthen 
[Israel 's] power and her spirit. There is no security without l a w " 1 4 . 
The Amer ican government , either r e p u b l i c a n 1 5 or d e m o c r a t e 1 6 will 
hardly exercise any pressure for compl iance with the dicta of the opinions the 
advisory nature of which were emphas ized in the Amer ican media, even if Sir 
Gerald Fi tzmaurice , one of the best known international l awyer of the Engl ish 
speeking world rightly pointed out before the International L a w Commiss ion 
of the U N that "al though advisory opinions are not binding, there are t w o 
cases in which they would appear to be in pract ice negatively binding, i.e. to 
have prohibitory force, namely, first, where the opinion indicates that a 
certain course of action would be contrary to international law or to the 
Char ter or to some other international instrument — in such a case it would 
be virtually impossible for the request ing organ to follow that course, and 
difficult for any individual M e m b e r state to d o so; second, where the opinion 
indicates that, of various possible courses , only one is the correct course 
legally — here again, if anything is done at all, it would appear difficult in 
pract ice not to follow the course advocated by the C o u r t " 1 7 . Never theless , 
13. Cited by: Court orders changes to West Bank wall - Guardian, June 30, 
2004, referred supra. 
14. SLIMAN, op. cit. 
15. See the official American governmental position e.g. -in the statement of 
ambassador Danforth before the General Assembly, July 16, 2004: cited in 
USINFO.STATE.GOV: http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive/2004/Jull9-585878.html 
or in the part "explanation of votes" of the Press Release GA/1488 (July 20, 2004). 
16. Statement by John Kerry on International Court of Justice Ruling Regarding 
Israel's Security Fence (US Newswire - Medialink Worldwide, 7/9/2004) "I am 
deeply disappointed by today's International Court of Justice ruling related to Israel's 
security fence. Israel's fence is a legitimate response to terror that only exists in 
response to the wave of terror attacks against Israel. The fence is an important tool in 
Israel's fight against terrorism. It is not a matter for the ICJ. I have made very clear 
from the start that I do not belive that the ICJ should eeven be considering this issue 
given that they do not have jurisdiction". 
17. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. 29 (1952), pp. 54-55, 
cited by Ian Brownlie before the International Court of Justice at the public sitting 
held on October 17 1997 in the case concerning Questions of Interpretation and 
application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at 
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there are minor signs that Washington has expectat ions of changes in Israeli 
p o l i c y 1 8 . In this way , the U S confirms the critical a p p r o a c h 1 9 which could be 
observed already in 2003 paralel to the veto against a draft resolution 
condemning the wall . It is to note however that the United States is concerned 
by the rul ing not only as Is rae l ' s closest ally, but also by the substantive 
article (§§ 138-139, precited) about legit imate self-defence. In the debate of 
the Genera l Assembly , the Amer ican ambassador cri t ized this point sharply, 
represent ing the refusal of the so-called enlarged self-defence concept of 
today ' s Amer ica fighting against international t e r r o r i s m 2 0 . The European 
Un ion ' s posit ion submit ted before the Court by I r e l a n d 2 1 , assuming the tasks 
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya vs. United sates of America) in § 16 of the 
verbatim record. 
18. "The Bush administration strongly signalled Israel this week that its patience 
is flagging with respect to continued work on the fence. The White House came closer 
than ever before to linking the barrier project to its stance on settlement construction, 
which Washington has condemned for decades as a central obstacle to Middle East 
peace. (...) «We have made our concerns known. Those concerns remain», White 
House Press Secretary Scott McClellan said of the dispute over the security fence". 
Bradley Burston: Background / Fence divides Israel and U.S., Israeli and Israeli. 
Haaretz, October 28, 2004 - See on http://www.haaretz.com and www.haaretzdaily. 
com 
19. In October 2003, news agencies reported that "after publicly criticised the 
fence and the wall that Israel is bulding in the West Bank, the Bush Administration is 
quietly negotiating with the Israeli Government to change the route of the barrier". 
Mark Matthews: US leans on Israel to change route of its security wall (The Baltimore 
Sun, Agence France Press, Associated Press, October 14, 2003) http://www.smh.com. 
au/articles/2003/10/13/1065917343961.html. 
"President George Bush had merely called the barrier a «problem»". US blocks 
action on Israeli 'wall' BBC October 15, 2003 http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/ 
middle_east/3192762.stm 
20. "So the Court opinion, which this resolution would accept, seems to say that 
the right of a State to defend itself exists only when it is attacked by another state, and 
that the right of self-defense does not exist against non-state actors. It does not exist 
when terrorists hijack planes and fly them into buildings, or bomb train stations, or 
bomb bus stops, or put poison gas into subways. I would suggest that if this were the 
meaning of Article 51, then the United Nations Charter could be irrelevant in a time 
when the major threats to peace are not from states, but from terrorist"] 
http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive/2004/Jull9-585878.html 
21. The brief written on January 30, 2004 by Brian Cowen, minister for foreign 
affairs of Ireland was in fact only a formal notification of handing in the written form 
the statement of Marcello Spatafora, Italian ambassador to the UN, made on behalf of 
the EU on December 8, 2003 before the General Assembly. Its most relevant parts are 
as follows: "The European Union regrets the fact that israel, according to the report of 
the Secretary General pursuant to General assembly resolution ES-10/13 is not in 
compliance with the Assembly's demand that it stops and reverses the construction of 
the wall int he Occupied Palestinian Territories. The European Union believes that the 
proposed request for an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice will 
not help the efforts of the two parties to relaunch a political dialogue and therefore 
inappropriate. (...) While recognizing Israel's right to protect its citizens from terrorist 
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of the presidency in rotation, was however ambiguous: it condemned the 
w a l l 2 2 but it also opposed the delivery of the advisory opinion as politically 
inappropriate. Nevertheless , the countries of the European Union abstained at 
the voting on the motion about the request of the General Assembly , but 
voted in favour of resolution ES-10/L .18 , adopted in the aftermath of the 
p ronouncement of the ruling which was received "with respect" and which 
"(1) Acknowledges the advisory opinion, (2) Demands that Israel, the 
occupying Power , comply with its legal obligations as ment ioned in the 
Advisory Opinion, (3) Calls upon all States M e m b e r s of the United Nat ions to 
comply with their legal obligations as ment ioned in the Advisory Opin ion" 
etc. 
5. LOOKING FURTHER... 
The view of the ICJ about the failure of execution of international 
commi tments and the breaches of international law can hardly be challenged: 
wha t the judges said did not differ from what had already been said several 
t imes by the political organs of the United Nat ions , somet imes also by the 
Security Counci l , not to speak of other international organizat ions, the 
International Commi t tee of the Red Cross , most state-chancelleries, U N -
special rapporteurs , etc. It is true that the comprehens ive , judicial recapi-
tulation of previous resolutions and evaluat ions, the authoritative interpre-
tation of commi tmen t s based on treaty law as well as hard and soft law type 
UN-document s created a qualitatively different situation. Richard Fa lk is 
rightly stating that "such a plain-spoken ruling from the characteristically 
cautious International Court of Just ice will test the respect accorded 
international l a w " 2 3 . 
A most important issue of recent judicial stock-taking has already been 
raised in the title: can the decision of the ICJ be considered as an opinion or is 
it a quasi j udgemen t disguised in the form of consultat ive opinion? 
attacks, the European Union urges the Government of Israel, in exercising this right, to 
fully respect international law in particular human rights and international 
humanitarian law". 
22. While Germany and Great Britain abstained, France and Spain voted int he 
Security Council in favour of the draft vetoed by the US on October 15, 2003. 
23. FALK: loc.cit. 
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The logic of the wall opinion suggests that since July 9 2004, a UNO vs. 
State dispute can apparently be adjudged without explicit statutory habili-
tation. Does this mean that a third type judicial procedure was born in the 
practice of the International Court of Just ice? 
It is certainly a del icate situation when procedures launched on the basis 
of headquar ter -agreements should be qualified as advisory opinion. It is also 
clear that some international organizat ions can live together with Organi-
zation vs. State (or vica versa State vs. Organizat ion) lawsuits , the best known 
example being the internal judicial complex of the European Communi t i es . 
In the history of the International Court of Justice, one cannot forget the 
Advisory Opinion concerning the Legal Consequences for States of the 
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia24, which was delivered in a 
similar situation, even if posterior to the real decision i.e. the revocat ion of 
the mandate by the General Assembly and the Security Counci l . The advisory 
opinion about certain expenses of the United Nations2^ is also an example for 
the conflict be tween the Organizat ion and — in the given case not one but 
two - failing states. The advisory opinion on Western Sahara26 was de facto 
an appreciat ion of the legal and historical backgrounds of Mauri tanian and 
Maroccan territorial pretensions over the territory: here, the Assembly acted 
quasi as the representant of a people , beneficiary of the right of self-
determinat ion. In the Mazilu-case (advisory opinion on the Applicability of 
Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of 
the United Nations)21, the Economic and Social Counci l asked the ICJ 
whether the ment ioned point was applicable to the situation of the Special 
Rappor teur of the Sub-Commiss ion on Prevent ion of Discr iminat ion and 
Protection of Minori t ies which was unsuccesfully denied by Ceausescu ' s 
Romania . Howeve r the introductory phrase already clearly reflected that the 
the issue had organizat ion vs. state n a t u r e 2 8 . T h e advisory opinion on the 
Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur 
of the Commission on Human Rights2^, was linked to a similar organizat ion 
24. Delivered on June 21, 1971. 
25. Delivered on June 20, 1962. 
26. Delivered on October 16, 1975. 
27. Delivered on December 15, 1989. 
28. "a difference has arisen between the United Nations and the Government of 
Romania as to the applicability of the Convention". ICJ Reports 1989 p. 177-178. 
29. Delivered on of April 29, 1999. 
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vs. State type conflict concerning the status of Cumaraswamy , Special Rap-
porteur on the Independence of Judges and L a w y e r s 3 0 . 
In the jur i sprudence of the Permanent Court of International Just ice, the 
possibilit ies to disguise the apprehension of the Organizat ion for breaches of 
international law commit ted by a state in form of an advisory opinion, were 
even more evident. It mus tn ' t be forgotten that the separation of interstate 
litigations and advisory opinions has never been very clear either in the 
Covenant , in the statute and rules of the Permanent Court of International 
J u s t i c e 3 1 or in its jur i sprudence . The simplici ty with which a part icular state 
vs. state p rob lem was t ransformed into an advisory o p i n i o n 3 2 is spectacular. 
In the thirties, Csiky, a Hungar ian international lawyer belonging to the Buza-
s c h o o l 3 3 called this phenomenon as "adjudging opinion" in his book about the 
P C I J 3 4 . This was not complete ly incompat ible with authoritative tendencies 
of the contemporary doctr ine: thus on the basis of the report presented by the 
French Albert de la Pradelle and the Rumanian Démét re Négulesco , j u d g e of 
the PCIJ , the Institute of International L a w adopted in 1937 a resolution on 
the legal nature of advisory opinions of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice and on their value and significance in international law (September 3 
1937, Luxembourg Session) calling on the use of advisory opinion procedure 
in case of impossibil i ty of submitt ing interstate c l a i m s 3 5 . The competences 
30. The Court formulated also that "Malaysia is obligated the obligation to 
communicate [the] advisory opinion to the Malaysian courts, in order that Malaysia's 
international obligations be given effect and [Mr.] Cumaraswamy's immunity be 
respected". (ICJ Reports 1999, § 65). 
31. According to article 14 of the Covenant 'The Court may also give an 
advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the 
Assembly". 
32. "Les avis consultatifs étaient demandes á la Cour, soit sur un point abstrait de 
droit international, soit sur un litige concret, né et actuel.(...) en pratique, le Conseil 
pouvait demander un avis á l'instigation d'un ou de plusieurs Etats intéressés". 
ROUSSEAU, Charles: Droit international public, Tome V, Sirey 1983 Paris p. 421 et 
423. 
33. Named after László Buza, academician and the most influential international 
lawyer in Hungary between 1920-1968. 
34. JÁNOS, C : Az Aliando Nemzetkozi Bíróság véleményez' hatáskóre (The 
advisory competence of the Permanent Court of International Justice), Szeged 1935 
Szeged Varosi Nyomda pp. 1-171. 
35. "L'Institut de Droit International, Considérant que, aux termes de Particle 14 
du pacte de la Société des Nations incorporé dans le Statut de la Cour permanente de 
Justice internationale, la Cour peut erre saisie d'une demande d'avis consultatif par 
l'Assemblée ou le Conseil de la Société des Nations sur tout "différend" out out 
"point"; Considérant qu'en droit, et dans l'état actuel des textes, quel que soit l'objet 
de la demande de l'avis consultatif, celui-ci se présente, conformément á la nature 
juridictionnelle de lam Cour, comme une solution de droit, sans caractére obligatoire; 
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attributed to the Permanent Court of International Justice in the system of the 
protection of minorit ies under the auspices of the League of Nations show 
some theoretical similarities with the present issue because the demands for 
advisory opinions were a lways l inked to real problems, breaches of law, 
al leged by peti t ions or c la ims submit ted by states. Even if de jure, the 
examinat ion of the complaints in the League of Nat ions was the duty of the 
Council , behind the quest ions submitted by the Counci l for advisory opinions 
to the PCIJ , concret allegations were recognizable . The disguised character of 
interstate disputes is manifest in some advisory opinions del ievered in the 
protection of minori t ies , e.g. i. on certain questions relating to settlers of 
German origin in the territory ceded by Germany to Poland^6, ii. on the 
access to German minority schools in Upper Silesia^1 and iii. on minority 
schools in Albania^. 
The former two were l inked to a legal dispute be tween Germany and 
Poland, the latter concerned a tension be tween Greece and Albania . In the 
two opinions on schools the q u e s t i o n s 3 9 submit ted to the PCIJ are evidently 
Considérant, en outre: Que la procedure consultative, entourée des garanties de la 
procedure judiciaire, contribue á la formation et au développement du Droit des Gens; 
Que la procedure consultative, facilitant le réglement judiciaire des conflits 
internationaux la oü l'arbitrage fait défaut, rend les plus grands services á la solution 
pacifique des différends; Exprime le voeu: l.Que dans le cas oü les puissances ne 
jugeront pas possible de soumettre leurs conflits au réglement judiciaire par la 
procedure contentieuse, elles en saisissent le Conseil, en lui demandant d'obtenir de la 
Cour un avis consultatif sur un ou plusieurs points litigeux; 2. Que dans les traites oü 
ne s'inscrit pas, pour tous les différends qui pourraient surgir de leur application ou 
interpretation, la clause compromissoire, instituant obligatoirement l'arbitrage ou le 
réglement judiciaire, soit expressément prévue la faculté pour Tune ou l'autre des 
Parties de s'adresser au Conseil sur tous différends nés et actuéis, pour lui demander 
de saisir la Cour pour avis consultatif; 3.Que dans les hypotheses prévues aux §§ l e t 2 
ci-dessus, le Conseil de la Société des Nations veuille prendre la requéte des Parties en 
tres sérieuse consideration". 
36. Delivered on September 10, 1923, Collection of Advisory Opinions Serie B 
n° 6. 
37. Delivered on May 15, 1931, Judgments, Orders and Advisory Opinions 
Series A/B n° 40. 
38. Delivered on April 6, 1935, Judgments, Orders and Advisory Opinions Series 
A/B n° 64. 
39. "Can the children who were excluded from the German Minoritsy schools on 
the basis of the language tests provided for in the Council's Resolution of March 12th, 
1927, be now, by reason of this circumstance, refused access to these schools?" Series 
A/B n° 40 p. 5. 
"Whether regard being had to the above-mentioned Declaration of October 2nd, 
1921, as a whole, the Albanian Government is justified in its plea that, as the abolition 
of the private schools in Albania, constitutes a general measure applicable to the 
majority as well as to the minority, it is in conformity with the letter and the spirit of 
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l inked to the meri ts of the case , so the answer to the quest ion could have had 
a decisive effect on the set t lement of the dispute, respectively with the 
success of the Ge rman and the Albanian posit ions. In the opinion on settlers 
the wording of the original q u e s t i o n 4 0 and that of the r e p l y 4 1 show 
astonishing similarity with the opinion on the wall . There is another similarity 
be tween minori ty protection issues and the wall case, namely the role played 
by the two organizat ions, respectively the League of Nat ions as guardian and 
guarantor of the minority c o m m i t m e n t s 4 2 and the Uni ted Nat ions having a 
charter procla iming the right to self-determination and the task of the 
Organizat ion to secure international peace and stability, rules containing 
arguments in favor of a special locus standi. Moreover , the deep involvement 
of the U N O from the beginning in the realisation of coexis tence be tween 
Israel and a Palest inian state could also be felt by the judges as justifying the 
interests of the organization. In a similar way, neither the L O N Covenant , nor 
did the U N Charter recognize expressis verbis this competence based on other 
treaties and hard & soft law type documents of the respective organizat ions. 
the stipulations laid down in Article 5, first paragraph, of that Declaration;" Series 
A/B n° 64 p. 5. 
40. " 1 . Do the points referred to (...) involve international obligations of the kind 
contemplated by the Treaty (...) signed at Versailles on June 28th, 1919 and do these 
points come within the competence of the League of Nations as defined in that Treaty? 
Should the first question be answered in the affirmative, the Council requests the 
Court to give an advisory opinion ont he question whether the position adopted by the 
Polish Government (...) is in conformity with is international obligations". Serie B n° 
6 p. 7. 
41 . "The Court is of the opinion that the points referred to (...) do involve 
international obligations of the kind contemplated by the Treaty (...) and that these 
points come within the competence of the League of Nations as defined in the Treaty; 
That the position adopted by the Polish Government, and referred to (...) was not 
in conformity with its international obligations". Serie B n° 6 p. 43. 
42. The wording of the pertinent peace treaties, conventions and unilateral 
declarations was nearly verbatim identical: "(. . .) the stipulations in the foregoing 
Articles of this Section, so far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or 
linguistic minorities, constitute obligations of international concern and shall be 
placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified 
without the assent of the éajority of the Council. (....) any Member of the Council of 
the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any 
infraction or any danger of infraction of any of these obligations (...) any difference of 
opinion as to questions of law or fact (...) shall be held to be a dispute of an 
international character (...) The (...) Government hereby consent that any such.dispute 
shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. ( . . .)" (e.g. text from article 60 of the Hungarian Peace Treaty of 
Trianon). 
464 
RATHER JUDGEMENT THAN OPINION? 
It should certainly be left to future judgemen t whether the International 
Court of Justice took here the politically right d e c i s i o n 4 3 . In the Near-East , no 
interstate quest ions can be answered solely on the basis of international law. 
This is actual reality: hopefully, the present decision of the International 
Court of Justice will contribute to the birth of a cl imate where the 
contradictory and prima facie inconcil iable interests can equally be taken into 
consideration during the final set t lement under the patronage of the United 
Nat ions. 
Does this very special advisory opinion — which was , in fact, a quasi 
j udgement (even if, of course, without a direct, binding nature) — falling 
upon a State in a lawsuit launched on a very peculiar basis remain an isolated 
phenomenon or does it mean the opening of a new jur isprudence in the 
metamorphoses of international law and the United Nat ions at the 
Mi l lennium? Al though the answer to this quest ion is a matter of the future, 
nevertheless a few examples can be found in the pract ice of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice that the 
judges in The Hague can rely upon. 
43. It is at least shocking that the logic of todays's criticism vis-a-vis the ruling 
of the ICJ coincides perfectly with the classic marxist approach, witnessed by an 
excerpt from Haraszti's contribution remembering the advisory opinion on the peace 
treaties.: "Hence, recourse to the International Court of Justice for advisory opinions 
on questions of predominantly political character is also practically inexpedient and 
even detrimental both to the United Nations and to the International Court". 
HARASZTI, G.: The Problem of International Jurisdicton, in Questions of 
International Law, Budapest 1964 Hungarian Branch of the International Law 
Association p. 37. 
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